

## Message Text

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EXDIS

FOL RPT ATHENS 2607 ACTION SECSTATE INFO ANKARA NICOSIA  
DATED 22 MAR 77

QUOTE: CONFIDENTIAL ATHENS 2607

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TAGS: PFOR, GR, US  
SUB: DISCUSSION WITH CARAMANLIS

1. ON MY RETURN FROM WASHINGTON OVER THE WEEKEND FROM  
MY CONSULTATIONS THERE LAST WEEK, AND IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH MY PREVIOUS ARRANGEMENTS WITH PRIME MINISTER  
CARAMANLIS, I CALLED HIM YESTERDAY AND SAID I  
WAS BACK AND THAT I HAD A LETTER FOR HIM FROM PRESIDENT  
CARTER. HE ASKED ME TO COME AND SEE HIM TODAY AND I  
HAVE JUST RETURNED TO MY OFFICE FROM A LONG PRIVATE  
MEETING WITH HIM AT WHICH MOLYVIATIS WAS ALSO PRESENT.  
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IN ADDITION TO DELIVERING PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER AND  
DISCUSSING A POSSIBLE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT IN  
LONDON IN MAY (SEPTEL), WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE CLIFFORD  
MISSION, GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS, CYPRUS, AND THE  
U.S- GREEK BASE NEGOTIATIONS. I SHALL SUMMARIZE  
THESE OTHER TOPICS IN THIS ONE TELEGRAM, OMITTING  
SOME DETAILS WHICH CARAMANLIS AND I HAVE  
DISCUSSED ON OTHER OCCASIONS AND WHICH HAVE ALREADY  
BEEN REPORTED EXTENSIVELY BEFORE.

2. CLIFFORD MISSION. CARAMANLIS ASKED IF THERE WAS ANYTHING I COULD ADD TO THE REPORTS HE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED OF THE CLIFFORD MISSION'S ACTIVITIES AND FINDINGS AFTER LEAVING ATHENS AND ON THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS CLIFFORD HAD MADE AFTER HIS RETURN TO WASHINGTON. I SAID THAT CLIFFORD HAD HAD A LONG MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ALEXANDRAKIS IN WASHINGTON LAST THURSDAY, AT WHICH NIMETZ, LEDSKY AND I HAD ALSO BEEN PRESENT, AND IN WHICH CLIFFORD HAD BEEN EXTREMELY FULL AND FRANK IN SUMMARIZING HIS VIEWS AND THE STATUS OF HIS RECOMMENDATIONS. CARAMANLIS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A FULL REPORT OF THAT MEETING. I TOLD HIM THAT AS FAR AS I KNEW, FINAL DECISIONS HAD NOT BEEN MADE WITHIN THE USG ON ALL OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY CLIFFORD BUT THAT MY CLEAR IMPRESSION WAS THAT CLIFFORD'S RECOMMENDATIONS--WHICH I PERSONALLY FOUND VERY SOUND AND SUPPORTED FULLY--HAD BEEN WELL RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON. MY EXPECTATION WAS THAT THEY WOULD PROBABLY BE APPROVED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. ALTHOUGH SOME FURTHER STUDY AND REVIEW WAS REQUIRED, AS WELL AS POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL CONSULTATION WITH THE CONGRESS, I ANTICIPATED THAT FINAL DECISIONS WOULD BE MADE AND BECOME KNOWN IN WASHINGTON SOON AFTER SECRETARY VANCE'S RETURN FROM HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP TO MOSCOW.

3. I ANSWERED SEVERAL OF CARAMANLIS' QUESTIONS ABOUT  
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SELECTED DETAILS IN CLIFFORD'S RECOMMENDATIONS AND SOUGHT TO PERSUADE HIM ON WHAT I CONSIDERED TO BE A CRICIAL AND CENTRAL CONCEPT OF CLIFFORD'S REPORT, NAMELY, THAT THE USG SHOULD SEEK TO MAXIMIZE ITS INFLUENCE WITH TURKEY WITH RESPECT TO PROBLEMS IN THE AREA BY FOLLOWING A TWO-PRONGED POLICY OF BENEFITS AND ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY WHEN THE LATTER BEHAVED CONSTRUCTIVELY, AND WITHHOLDING SUCH COOPERATION WHEN SUCH WAS NOT THE CASE. I SAID IT WAS MY IMPRESSION THAT TURKEY WAS INCLINED TO BE MORE CONSTRUCTIVE AND CONCILIATORY WITH RESPECT TO THE CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS AND, ACCORDINGLY, CLIFFORD HAD RECOMMENDED THE ENDORSEMENT IN PRINCIPLE OF THE TURKISH DCA AND A SOMEWHAT INCREASED AMOUNT OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY, ALTHOUGH NOT ACTUALLY URGING THAT THE USG COMPLETE LEGISLATIVE ACTION ON THE DCA ITSELF OR PROVIDE THE FULL AMOUNT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE ENVISAGED BY IT.

4. GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS. CARAMANLIS SIGHED. CAN'T WASHINGTON UNDERSTAND, HE ASKED, THE GAME THAT DEMIREL AND THE TURKS ARE PLAYING? TO IMPROVE HIS ELECTION PROSPECTS IN TURKEY, HE WENT ON, DEMIREL NEEDS TO RESTORE AND NORMALIZE U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS AND, THEREFORE, NEEDS THE DCA TO SYMBOLIZE THIS, AND AT THE

SAME TIME NEEDS TO APPEAR MANLY AND FIRM--EVEN  
TRUCULENT AND AGGRESSIVE--AS FAR AS GREECE IS CONCERNED.  
THUS, DEMIREL TRIES TO CONVEY AN IMPRESSION OF COOPERA-  
TION AND MODERATION WITH RESPECT TO CYPRUS WHILE AT THE  
SAME TIME BEHAVING AGGRESSIVELY IN THE AEGEAN. THEN,  
CARAMANLIS LAUNCHED INTO A TIRADE AGAINST TURKISH  
LEADERSHIP AND TURKS GENERALLY. HE POUNDED HIS SOFA  
AND THUMPED HIS OWN CHEST NOISILY<sup>9</sup> HE SAID HE WAS  
SICK AND TIRED OF THESE CONTINUED TURKISH "PROVOCATIONS"  
AND ACTIONS THAT "HUMILIATED" HIM AND THE GREEK PEOPLE.  
FOR EXAMPLE, HE CARRIED ON, THE TURKISH MILITARY EXERCISES  
NOW BEGINNING IN THE AEGEAN HAVE OBVIOUSLY, DELIBERATELY  
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BEEN LOCATED TO INTERRUPT OLYMPIC AIRLINES DOMESTIC  
FLIGHTS FROM THE MAINLAND TO GREEK ISLANDS AND TO CAUSE  
DETOURS AND INTERRUPTIONS OF DAILY FERRYBOAT  
SERVICES FROM ATHENS TO SOME OF THESE ISLANDS. GREECE  
RECOGNIZES TURKISH RIGHTS TO CONDUCT SUCH EXERCISES IN  
INTERNATIONAL WATERS IN THE AEGEAN, HE SAID, BUT WHY  
DID THEY HAVE TO PUT THEM IN SUCH PROVOCATIVE AND  
INSULTING LOCATIONS. MOREOVER, WHEN GREECE ASKED  
THAT SOME VERY, VERY SMALL MODIFICATIONS BE MADE IN  
THE EXERCISE ZONES SO AS NOT TO DISRUPT ATHENS'  
COMMUNICATIONS WITH SOME GREEK ISLANDS, TURKEY  
BRUSQUELY REFUSED. ALSO, HE HAD JUST RECEIVED A NEW  
PROPOSAL FROM THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT CONCERNING AIR  
SPACE OPERATING PROCEDURES IN THE AEGEAN WHICH, AMONG  
OTHER THINGS, AMOUNTED TO HIM--THE PRIME MINISTER  
OF GREECE\* -- HAVING TO NOTIFY ANKARA IN ADVANCE EVERY  
TIME HE WANTED TO FLY IN AN OFFICIAL GREEK AIRCRAFT IN  
AN EASTERLY DIRECTION -- EVEN FROM ATHENS TO CRETE\*  
IT WAS REALLY TOO MUCH. HE WAS DOING HIS BEST TO LET  
ANKARA KNOW THAT THERE WAS A LIMIT TO HOW MUCH HE COULD  
ENDURE AND STILL SURVIVE AS THE LEADER OF THE GREEK  
GOVERNMENT, AND HE WANTED WASHINGTON TO KNOW THIS AS  
WELL. I ASSURED HIM THAT WASHINGTON WAS WELL AWARE OF  
HIS VIEWS. I ONCE AGAIN COUNSELED HIM TO CONTINUE TO  
PROCEED AND CONDUCT THE AFFAIRS OF HIS GOVERNMENT WITH  
THE GREATEST MODERATION AND RESTRAINT, AND HE INDICATED  
THAT HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO DO SO BUT THAT WE SHOULD NOT  
BE SURPRISED OR UNPREPARED -- IF TURKEY PERSISTED IN  
SUCH ACTIONS -- IF THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN GREECE  
DEVELOPS BEYOND HIS ABILITY TO CONTROL IT.

9. CYPRUS. I ASKED CARAMANLIS HOW HE FELT ABOUT THE  
UPCOMING INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS IN VIENNA NEXT WEEK AND  
WHETHER HE WAS HOPEFUL SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS WOULD BE  
MADE. HE WAS NOT TERRIBLY INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING  
THIS SUBJECT IN DETAIL AND, INDEED, MADE A SOMEWHAT  
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ELLIPTICAL OBSERVATION ABOUT WASHINGTON'S APPARENT  
CONTINUED PREOCCUPATION WITH CYPRUS WHEN IN HIS VIEW  
THE MOST DANGEROUS PROBLEM IN THE AREA WAS THE AEGEAN AND THE  
RENEWED AND INCREASED RISK OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN  
GREECE AND TURKEY THAT COULD LEAD TO OUTRIGHT HOSTILITIES  
BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. HE SAID HE HAD NOTED IN PRESIDENT  
CARTER'S LETTER WHICH I HAD JUST DELIVERED TO HIM THE  
OMISSION OF ANY REFERENCE TO THE AEGEAN AND THE STRESS  
PLACED ON SETTLING THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. HE SAID HE EXPECTED  
THE TURKISH SIDE TO CONTINUE TO SHOW IN VIENNA THE MORE  
KINDLY AND COOPERATIVE ASPECT OF THEIR BASIC POLICIES,  
FOR THE REASONS INDICATED ABOVE, BUT THAT HE DID NOT  
REALLY EXPECT ANY SPECTACULAR BREAKTHROUGHS OR ANY MAJOR  
CONCESSIONS BY THE TURKS TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS SINCE HE  
SAW IT IN TURKEY'S INTEREST MERELY TO KEEP THE INTERCOMMUNAL  
TALKS GOING. HE ASSUMED THAT WASHINGTON AND INTERNATIONAL OPINION  
GENERALLY WOULD BE TO SOME DEGREE WELL IMPRESSED BY TURKEY'S  
POSTURE AND STATEMENTS IN VIENNA NEXT WEEK. HE FELT  
CONFIDENT THAT THE TURKS WOULD ADHERE SCRUPULOUSLY  
TO ANY UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED WITH CLIFFORD WHEN HE  
WAS IN ANKARA. WHETHER THE WAY WOULD BE OPEN FOR AN  
EVENTUAL NEGOTIATED AND GENERALLY SATISFACTORY  
SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS QUESTION WAS TOO EARLY TO SAY.  
THIS WOULD DEPEND UPON TURKISH POLICIES IN THE COMING WEEKS  
AND MONTHS, AND THESE IN TURN WOULD DEPEND UPON THE  
POLICIES AND ACTIONS ADOPTED IN WASHINGTON WITH RESPECT  
TO TURKEY. RESPONDING TO MY QUESTION, HE REAFFIRMED  
WHAT BITSIOS HAD TOLD ME LAST NIGHT, NAMELY, THAT HE AND  
THE GOG WOULD ALWAYS BE READY AND TRY TO BE HELPFUL IN  
MAKING PROGRESS ON THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND BRINGING ABOUT  
A SETTLEMENT. HE SAID THERE WAS NO WAY ANY GREEK  
GOVERNMENT COULD ACT OTHERWISE EVEN WERE IT IN ITS INTEREST  
TO DO SO, WHICH IT WAS NOT.

6. U.S.- GREEK NEGOTIATIONS ON DEFENSE COOPERATION.  
WE THEN DISCUSSED THE RESUMPTION OF OUR BASE NEGOTIATIONS,  
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NOW IN RECESS. CARAMANLIS SAID HE KNEW HE OWED US AN  
ANSWER ON THIS AS WELL AS A SUGGESTED TIME FOR  
RESUMING THEM. HOWEVER, HE ASKED FOR SOME ADDITIONAL  
TIME BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE RESUMEDM AS I KNEW, HE  
SAID, THE INITIATIVE TO OPEN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD  
ORIGINALLY COME FROM THE GREEK GOVERNMENT AND THE SUBSEQUENT  
PROPOSAL TO HAVE A U.S.-GREEK DEFENSE COOPERATION  
AGREEMENT COMPARABLE TO THE TURKISH ONE HAD ALSO  
COME FROM THE GREEK SIDE. THEREFORE, WE SHOULD BE  
IN NO DOUBT THAT HE AND HIS GOVERNMENT WANTED THESE  
AGREEMENTS AND WANTED TO CONCLUDE THEM ON A MUTUALLY  
ACCEPTABLE BASIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE MAJOR

PROBLEM NOW, HOWEVER, WAS TIMING; AND THE RENEWED TURKISH AGITATION AND PRESSURES IN THE AEGEAN SINCE CLIFFORD'S DEPARTURE -- AND THE OUTRAGE THIS HAS PROVOKED IN GREECE -- MADE IT INADVISABLE TO HAVE A U.S. NEGOTIATING TEAM COME TO ATHENS TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT IN THE NEXT WEEK OR TWO. I TOLD CARAMANLIS THAT WE HAD NO INTENTION OF PRESSURING HIM TO FINISH UP THESE NEGOTIATIONS IMMEDIATELY BUT BELIEVED IT WAS CLEARLY IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH OUR COUNTRIES TO CONCLUDE THEM BEFORE TOO MUCH ADDITIONAL TIME HAD PASSED. AFTER ALL, I SAID, IF THE GOG WOULD SIMPLY EASE OFF ON SEVERAL OF ITS MORE UNACCEPTABLE STICKING POINTS I FELT WASHINGTON WOULD TRY AND BE RESPONSIVE AND IN THAT WAY OFFICERS AT THE TECHNICAL AND PROFESSIONAL LEVELS OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS COULD FINISH UP DRAFTING THE DOCUMENTS FAIRLY QUICKLY. I FELT THAT WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ONLY TWO OR THREE SUCH EXPERTS FROM WASHINGTON WE COULD KEEP SUCH NEGOTIATING CONTACTS THEMSELVES IN A VERY LOW KEY AND THEN THE DOCUMENTS COULD BE FINISHED AND TURNED OVER TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS FOR THEIR REVIEW AND STUDY AND WOULD BE READY AT ANY TIME POLICY-LEVEL OFFICIALS WISHED TO TAKE FURTHER ACTION ON THEM, SUCH AS SUBMITTING THEM FOR REVIEW BY OUR RESPECTIVE PARLIAMENT

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AND CONGRESS. CARAMANLIS SAID HE WOULD THINK THIS OVER ALTHOUGH HE WAS CERTAIN IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO KEEP THE MATTER SECRET IN ATHENS IF ANY NEGOTIATORS AT ALL ARRIVED FROM WASHINGTON. GIVEN GREEK-TURKISH TENSIONS RIGHT NOW AND THE INTERNAL POLITICAL HEAT IN THE COUNTRY HE DID NOT WANT TO EXPOSE THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO SENSATIONAL AND DAMAGING ATTACKS IN THE PRESS, WHERE HE FELT HIS ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE PORTRAYED AS BOWING TO WASHINGTON PRESSURES OR PLAYING DEMIREL'S GAME. HE SAID HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH ME AGAIN IN A WEEK OR SO, AFTER THE TURKISH AEGEAN EXERCISES ARE COMPLETED -- HOPEFULLY WITHOUT ANY DANGEROUS INCIDENTS. THEN WE CAN SET A DATE AND MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR RESUMING THE NEGOTIATIONS, PERHAPS SOME TIME AFTER GREEK EASTER, APRIL 10. THINKING ALOUD, CARAMANLIS WONDERED WHETHER IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO HANDLE THE NEGOTIATIONS EXCLUSIVELY BY ROUTINE DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS BETWEEN MY EMBASSY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, WITHOUT HAVING ANY SPECIAL NEGOTIATING PERSONNEL SENT OUT FROM WASHINGTON. THEN ONCE WE HAD REACHED, OR NEARLY REACHED, AGREEMENT -- AND THE TIMING WAS RIGHT -- A NEGOTIATING TEAM COULD COME OUT FROM WASHINGTON TO PUT THE FINISHING TOUCHES ON THE DOCUMENTS AND AGREEMENT. CARAMANLIS SAID THAT WHEN THE TIME CAME HE WANTED TO SEE THE NEGOTIATIONS WRAPPED UP QUICKLY IN A WEEK OR

TEN DAYS IF POSSIBLE, THAT IF THEY WERE PROTRACTED  
OVER MANY WEEKS AGAIN THERE WOULD SURELY BE SOME PRE-  
MATURE "LEAKAGE" IN THE GREEK GOVERNMENT AND OPPONENTS  
WOULD BE SNIPING AWAY AT THEM INCESSANTLY, MAKING HIS  
JOB OF GETTING THEM ENDORSED LATER BY THE GREEK  
PARLIAMENT MORE DIFFICULT. I TOLD HIM I FEARED WE DID  
NOT HAVE THE LEGAL AND TECHNICAL EXPERTISE IN THE  
EMBASSY TO COVER ALL THE REMAINING GROUND BUT WOULD  
CERTAINLY REPORT HIS THOUGHTS TO WASHINGTON. WE  
ENDED OUR MEETING BY AGREEING TO GET IN TOUCH AGAIN  
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ON THIS SUBJECT IN A WEEK OR SO AND ALSO TO STAY IN CLOSE  
TOUCH ON THE OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED.

7. AS I WAS LEAVING I TOLD CARAMANLIS ONCE AGAIN  
WHAT A FINE IMPRESSION HE HAD MADE ON CLARK CLIFFORD  
AND THE MEMBERS OF HIS MISSION AND TOLD HIM THAT I  
HAD SEEN AND TALKED TO CLIFFORD SEVERAL TIMES WHILE  
I WAS IN WASHINGTON AND THAT CLIFFORD HAD ASKED ME  
TO CONVEY HIS SPECIAL WARM AND FRIENDLY GREETINGS TO  
CARAMANLIS, TOWARDS WHOM CLIFFORD HAD FELT A VERY  
SPECIAL EMPATHY AND BOND DEVELOPED. CARAMANLIS  
ASKED ME TO RECIPROCATE THE VERY SAME SENTIMENTS OF  
HIS OWN TOWARDS CLIFFORD, ADDING THAT CLIFFORD WAS A  
MAN FOR WHOM HE HAD ALREADY DEVELOPED GREAT ADMIRATION  
AND RESPECT. KUBISCH UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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